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Summary
Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) in March 2010, some have argued that health 
reform would erode employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) 
by providing incentives for employers to stop offering 
coverage. Others have claimed that most businesses would 
face increased costs as a result of reform, or even that the 
uncertainties surrounding the impact of health reform is 
hampering the economic recovery. This paper finds that 
the effects on employer coverage and employer health care 
spending would actually be small. 
Using the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM), we estimate how the Affordable 
Care Act would affect employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) and employer health care costs. To investigate the 
effects of health reform on ESI, we simulate the ACA as if 
fully implemented in 2010 and contrast the results with 
the pre-reform HIPSM baseline results for 2010. We also 
present HIPSM estimates on how ESI coverage would have 
changed over time without health reform, given changes 
in economic conditions and long-term health care cost 
growth. We divide employers into three groups: small firms 
with 100 or fewer workers, medium firms with 101 to 1,000 
workers, and large firms with more than 1,000 workers.
We estimate that
•	Overall ESI coverage under the ACA would not differ 
significantly from what coverage would be without 
reform. Small- and medium-firm ESI coverage would be 
almost unchanged, and large-firm ESI coverage would 
increase by just over 2 percentage points. Large-firm ESI 
policies cover more people than small- and medium-firm 
policies combined.
•	Total employer spending on premium contributions, 
assessments, and vouchers would be 0.6 percent lower 
under ACA than without reform. Total spending by small 
firms would be 8.7 percent lower, mainly due to cost 
savings from the new ESI (SHOP) exchanges. The smallest 
firms would also be eligible for tax credits. Total spending 
by medium firms would increase by 11.8 percent, largely 
due to new assessments required of employers with 
workers independently buying subsidized insurance 
through the nongroup exchanges. Significant assessments 
could occur for firms not offering ESI and those who offer 
a plan their low-income workers cannot afford. Spending 
by large firms would not change significantly.
•	The average employer contribution per person covered by 
ESI would decrease by 7.9 percent for small firms, 1.1 
percent for medium firms, and 3.1 percent for large 
firms. For small firms, the decline is due mainly to the 
introduction of more cost-effective coverage through 
SHOP exchanges. The much smaller declines for medium 
and large firms are due to improvements in the ESI 
risk pools. In particular, those currently not enrolled 
who would enroll due to the individual mandate have 
lower costs on average than current enrollees. Total ESI 
premiums and premium dollars paid by workers would 
both see similar decreases.
•	 In the absence of health reform, ESI coverage would 
fall by 2.6 percentage points in five years in our best-
case scenario with 5 percent annual growth in private 
premiums. With 8 percent annual growth in premiums, 
the decline would be 7.6 percentage points in five 
years. Health costs have grown faster than inflation 
for many years, leading some employers, particularly 
small employers, to stop offering ESI to their workers. 
Our analysis suggests that trend would continue in the 
absence of health reform. 
Some observers will likely conflate the trend of falling ESI 
coverage with the effects of specific provisions in the ACA. 
Analysts will need to account for how ESI coverage would 
have changed in the absence of reform when evaluating 
the future effects of the ACA. Ultimately, only effective cost 
control measures can address the current trend. Beyond 
cost control, the ACA can slow the current trend via 
subsidies to small employers, by cost savings generated by 
the exchanges (particularly administrative costs), through 
penalties on employers that do not offer coverage, and by 
increasing demand for ESI through the individual mandate.
Our findings of little overall effect of the ACA on ESI 
coverage are similar to the findings of the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and run counter to some arguments 
predicting a major decline in ESI. We discuss those 
arguments and provide reasons why we believe claims  
that the ACA would cause major declines in ESI coverage 
are exaggerated. 
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Introduction
Since the enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 
March 2010, many people, particularly in 
the business media and advocacy groups 
opposed to the ACA, have argued that 
health reform would erode employer-
sponsored insurance by providing 
incentives for many employers to stop 
offering coverage. Using the Urban 
Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model, we estimate how 
the Affordable Care Act would affect 
employer-sponsored insurance and 
employer health care costs. We separate 
the effects on businesses of different 
sizes. Small businesses are defined here as 
those employing 100 or fewer workers. 
These employers would be eligible for 
new employer-sponsored insurance 
exchanges (or SHOP exchanges) under 
the ACA. Medium businesses are those 
employing 101 to 1,000 workers, and 
large businesses are those employing 
more than 1,000 workers. 
To investigate the effects of health 
reform on ESI, we simulate the ACA as 
if it were fully implemented in 2010 and 
contrast the results with the prereform 
HIPSM baseline results for 2010. We also 
present HIPSM estimates on how ESI 
coverage would have changed over time 
without health reform, given changes 
in economic conditions and long-term 
health care cost growth. 
Some have claimed that the ACA will 
greatly increase health care costs for 
employers and that many employers 
would drop ESI coverage as a result. 
Our results show the opposite—
the ACA has little effect on overall 
ESI coverage and overall employer 
spending on health care would be 
slightly lower under the ACA. We 
discuss the arguments for why some 
employers might stop offering ESI 
after reform and provide reasons why 
we believe claims that ACA would 
cause major declines in ESI coverage 
are exaggerated. 
Methods
To estimate the effects of health reform, 
we use the Urban Institute’s Health 
Insurance Policy Simulation Model.1 
HIPSM simulates the decisions of 
businesses and individuals in response 
to policy changes, such as Medicaid 
expansions, new health insurance 
options, subsidies for the purchase of 
health insurance, and insurance market 
reforms. The model provides estimates 
of changes in government and private 
spending, premiums, rates of employer 
offers of coverage, and health insurance 
coverage resulting from specific reforms.2
Within the model, workers are assigned 
to representative firms. Firms’ decisions 
whether to offer coverage depend on 
their workers’ demand for ESI. All else 
equal, firms with a higher share of 
younger and healthier workers, workers 
with other offers of ESI in the family, 
and workers with lower incomes who 
face lower tax rates and are eligible 
for Medicaid or subsidized coverage in 
the exchanges are less likely to offer 
health insurance. Firms with a higher 
share of workers who place a high 
value on health benefits and have fewer 
opportunities for subsidized coverage 
or coverage through a spouse are more 
likely to offer health insurance coverage. 
Health insurance benefits are considered 
part of a total compensation package 
employers offer to their workers. 
There is empirical evidence that in a 
competitive labor market, reductions 
in benefits, such as health insurance, 
are offset by increases in wages, and 
vice versa, at least over time. Firms are 
limited in their ability to adjust wages 
worker by worker based on who takes 
up offered coverage.3 This means that 
if an employer stops offering ESI, the 
savings to be passed back to workers are 
distributed among all workers, not just 
those who were enrolled in ESI.
Changes in worker demand for ESI 
resulting from policy changes or 
premium changes, and taking wage 
offsets in to account, lead to changes 
in the probabilities that firms offer 
health insurance. The sensitivity of 
firms’ responses is calibrated to hit 
target elasticities from the empirical 
economics literature and reflects the 
finding that small firms are more elastic 
than large firms.
We model the main coverage provisions 
of the Affordable Care Act. We simulate 
the ACA as if fully implemented in 
2010 and compare it with the HIPSM 
baseline results for prereform 2010. 
This approach differs from that of the 
CBO and the actuaries at the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) who by necessity provide 10-year 
estimates. Our approach permits more 
direct comparisons of reform with the 
prereform baseline. An earlier policy 
brief summarized the most important 
coverage provisions of the ACA and how 
they were reflected in the modeling.4 
The provisions directly affecting 
employers are as follows: 
•	New state-based health insurance 
exchanges (the exchanges) offer plans 
constructed to meet actuarial value 
standards of 60, 70, and 80 percent.5 
Exchange plans are guaranteed issue, 
as are all plans in the small group and 
nongroup markets. Premiums may be 
rated by age and tobacco use, with 
age bands of up to 3:1 and tobacco 
use bands of up to 1.5:1.6 Exchange-
based insurance coverage is available 
to individuals and families purchasing 
nongroup coverage independent 
of an employer and to employer 
groups with 100 or fewer employees.7 
Undocumented immigrants are barred 
from the exchange.
•	 Employees of firms that offer coverage 
will be ineligible for subsidized 
coverage in the exchange unless the 
employee’s share of the premium 
exceeds 9.5 percent of income or if 
the actuarial value of the employer 
plan is less than 60 percent. 
•	Employee choice vouchers are 
available to workers whose employers 
offer health insurance coverage 
through the workplace, whose 
incomes are below 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level (FPL), and whose 
share of the lowest offered employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) premium 
is between 8 and 9.8 percent of 
income. Qualified workers can receive 
a voucher for the amount that their 
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employer would have contributed 
to their insurance premium if they 
had enrolled in the employer’s plan. 
They can then apply this voucher to 
help pay for insurance through an 
exchange.8
•	A small-group tax credit is available 
to firms that offer health insurance, 
have 25 or fewer employees, and have 
workers with an average pay of less 
than $50,000.
•	New assessments may apply to 
employers with more than 50 
employees. If such a firm does not 
offer coverage and has at least one 
full-time employee who receives 
a subsidy in the exchange, a fee 
of $2,000 per full-time employee 
is assessed, excluding the first 30 
employees. Employers that do offer 
coverage but have at least one full-
time employee who receives a subsidy 
are assessed the lesser of $3,000 for 
each employee getting subsidies or 
$2,000 per full-time employee.
•	There is risk adjustment in the small-
group ESI and nongroup markets 
between plans both inside and outside 
the exchange.
•	 Most health insurance market reforms 
apply to all small-group (up to 100 
workers) ESI policies issued inside 
or outside the exchange, except for 
grandfathered plans.9
The methodology used for the estimates 
of ESI coverage over time without health 
reform is described in a prior report.10
Results
We present three types of results: 
changes in coverage and costs of 
employer-sponsored insurance, ESI offer 
rates for small firms, and ESI premium 
trends due to the ACA.
ESI Coverage and Costs
In Table 1, we summarize ESI coverage 
and employer costs under the ACA and 
without health reform. Without health 
reform, 151.6 million nonelderly people 
would have health insurance coverage 
through their employer; 30.5 million 
of these would be covered under plans 
issued by small employers (those with 
100 or fewer employees), 30.1 million 
by medium employers (those with 101 
to 1,000 employees), and 67.3 million 
by large employers (more than 1,000 
employees). There are also 23.7 million 
people who report ESI coverage on 
the Current Population Survey for 
whom there is no policyholder in 
the household or who report being 
ESI policyholders while not being in 
the workforce (these individuals are 
reported separately at the bottom of  
the table). 
Under health reform, the number 
covered by ESI would decline very 
slightly to 151.2 million. Coverage 
under small-firm and medium-firm ESI 
policies would each change by less 
than 1 percent, while coverage under 
large-firm ESI policies would increase 
by 1.5 million or 2.2 percent. This 
increase is due primarily to increased 
participation (take-up) in employer-
offered plans that will result from the 
individual requirement to obtain health 
insurance (i.e., the individual mandate). 
As the small scale of the changes in ESI 
enrollment suggests, overall employer 
offer rates are largely unchanged. 
Various provisions of the ACA will affect 
different firms differently. Some would 
drop ESI and others would start offering 
it; these would largely cancel out. 
Without health reform, premium 
contributions are the only health 
care–related employer expenses 
simulated by HIPSM.11 Total expenses 
would be $114.6 billion for small 
employers, $98.9 billion for medium 
employers, and $228.0 billion for 
large ones (Table 2).12 Under the ACA, 
premium contributions would be by 
Table 1. Changes in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Coverage Due to the ACA
Total
Small Firms  
(<100 Employees)
Medium Firms  
(100–1,000 Employees)
Large Firms  
(1,000+ Employees)
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA1 % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Total ESI
Persons covered 151.6 151.2 -0.3%
ESI policyholders and coverage (in millions)
Single policyholders 44.4 46.5 4.9% 11.8 12.1 2.8% 10.4 10.7 3.3% 22.2 23.7 6.8%
Family policyholders 27.5 27.5 -0.2% 6.2 6.1 -1.2% 6.5 6.5 0.1% 14.9 14.9 0.1%
Persons covered 127.9 129.5 1.2% 30.5 30.4 -0.4% 30.1 30.3 0.7% 67.3 68.8 2.2%
Coverage where no policyholder is identifiable2 (in millions)
Persons covered 23.7 21.7 -8.5%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1 We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act fully implemented in 2010.
2 Persons in the CPS reporting ESI coverage when no policyholder is present in the household.
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far the largest component of employer 
expenses, but would no longer be the 
only one. Total premium contributions 
for small employers would be $105.3 
billion after reform, a decline of 8.2 
percent. This decrease is largely due 
to the introduction of health insurance 
exchanges for employers (SHOP 
exchanges). These small employers 
would receive $4.5 billion in employer 
subsidies while paying $2 billion 
in assessments and $1.9 billion in 
employee choice vouchers. The result 
would be a decline in total spending  
of 8.7 percent.
Medium employers would see a decrease 
of less than 1 percent in premium 
contributions. However, they would pay 
$11.8 billion in assessments and $0.2 
billion in employee choice vouchers. 
Medium employers are hit much harder 
by the assessment formula than large 
employers because they employ more 
subsidy-eligible workers and have 
somewhat lower ESI offer rates. The result 
is an 11.8 percent increase in spending in 
aggregate. Firms that offer ESI coverage 
that their low-income workers prefer 
to the exchange would not see large 
assessments. Firms may be able to reduce 
their assessments by changing their 
contribution rate or the structure of the 
policies they offer; however, we do not 
simulate such behavior. 
Large employers would save 1 percent 
in premium contributions, but would 
pay $3.8 billion in assessments and $0.9 
billion in vouchers. The net result would 
be a 1 percent increase in spending over 
this group.
In Table 3, we examine how the average 
employer premium contribution per 
person covered by ESI would change 
under the ACA. Employer premium 
contributions vary, but the employer 
pays on average 80 percent of the total 
ESI premium. The average contribution 
per person declines under the ACA for 
small firms by 7.9 percent, from $3,755 
to $3,460. Thus, it is significantly less 
expensive for small firms to provide 
insurance under the ACA than without 
health reform. We discuss the reasons 
why below. The average premium 
contribution decreases for medium 
firms by 1.1 percent and for large firms 
by 3.1 percent. Thus, ESI premiums 
decline for all firm sizes, though the 
difference is much smaller for medium 
and large firms. Overall, the average 
premium contribution would decline 
by 3.9 percent.
Finally, the individuals and families 
in HIPSM are based on the Current 
Population Survey. Some respondents 
report having ESI coverage from 
Table 2. Changes in Employer Spending Due to the ACA
Total
Small Firms  
(<100 Employees)
Medium Firms  
(100–1,000 Employees)
Large Firms  
(1,000+ Employees)
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA1 % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Without 
reform
ACA % Diff
Total ESI
Employer premium 
contributions
513.3 494.1 -3.7%
Employer costs 513.3 510.2 -0.6%
Employer costs (in billions $)
Premium contributions 441.6 429.4 -2.8% 114.6 105.3 -8.19% 98.9 98.5 -0.46% 228.0 225.6 -1.0%
Employer subsidies 0.0 -4.5 0.0 -4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Assessments 0.0 17.6 0.0 2.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 3.8
Vouchers 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.9
Total contributions 441.6 445.7 0.9% 114.6 104.6 -8.72% 99.0 110.6 11.80% 228.0 230.3 1.0%
Premium contributions where no policyholder is identifiable2 (in billions $)
Premium contributions 71.8 64.7 -9.8%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1 We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act fully implemented in 2010.
2 Persons in the CPS reporting ESI coverage when no policyholder is present in the household.
Table 3. Changes Due to ACA in Average Employer Contributions  
per Person Covered
Without reform ACA1 % Diff
Small firms (<100 employees) $3,755 $3,460 -7.86%
Medium firms (100–1,000 employees) $3,290 $3,252 -1.14%
Large firms (1,000+ employees) $3,386 $3,280 -3.1%
Total $3,451 $3,316 -3.9%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1 We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act fully implemented in 2010.
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someone outside the CPS household, 
others report ESI with no potential 
policyholder in the household, and still 
others report being an ESI policyholder 
without being in the work force. There 
is no way to identify the employer 
characteristics of the policyholders of 
these plans. Rather than allocate these 
cases across employers, we tabulate their 
coverage and costs separately. Many 
of these are children, so their average 
premium contributions are somewhat 
lower than the averages above.
ESI Offer Rates for Small Firms
In Table 4, we present ESI offer rates for 
firms with fewer than 50 employees. 
The offer rate would increase 4.3 
percentage points overall for small 
firms. The smallest firms would see 
the biggest increase; the offer rate for 
firms with fewer than 10 employees 
would increase by 5 percentage points. 
This is in part due to the premium tax 
credit and in part to the larger savings 
to the smallest employers by offering 
ESI through the SHOP exchanges. 
Administrative premium loads for ESI 
outside these exchanges are on average 
much higher for firms with fewer than 
25 employees than the expected load 
in the exchanges. For firms of 25 to 
49 employees, it is generally higher—
depending on factors such as industry—
but the difference is smaller.
Besides administrative costs savings in 
the SHOP exchanges and the premium 
tax credits, there are other important 
factors specific to the ACA that are 
considered in our simulation of ESI 
offer decisions. The individual mandate 
increases demand for insurance 
coverage. However, those eligible for 
subsidies in the nongroup exchanges 
may prefer to take that coverage 
instead, reducing the demand for ESI. 
Employees eligible for vouchers may 
want to be offered ESI in order to take 
the voucher. On the other hand, if too 
many employees prefer taking vouchers 
instead of enrolling in ESI, the employer 
may decide not to offer. Thus, even 
within a single firm, there would be 
factors affecting offer decisions in 
both directions.
ESI without Health Reform  
over Time
In an earlier report, we simulated how 
health insurance coverage and costs 
would change over time if no health 
reform were enacted.13 Figure 1 shows 
how the share of nonelderly persons 
with ESI coverage would change over 
time under three scenarios. These 
scenarios vary in assumptions about 
economic factors, such as employment 
and how health care costs and 
premiums would grow over time. The 
estimated declines in ESI coverage 
over time are significant even under 
the best case scenario. Average annual 
rates of premium growth were 5, 7, 
and 8 percent in the best, intermediate, 
and worst case scenarios, respectively. 
Trends in premiums for 2010 suggest 
growth rates even higher than in our 
worst case scenario.14 
As long as underlying health costs 
grow faster than inflation, there will be 
pressure on some firms to stop offering 
ESI. This should not be confused with 
the specific provisions in the ACA and 
can ultimately be addressed only by 
effective cost control measures. Besides 
cost control, the ACA is expected to 
slow this downward trend in ESI offer to 
some extent via cost savings generated 
by the new health insurance exchanges 
and by increasing demand for ESI 
through the individual mandate.
Discussion: Why ESI  
Won’t Die
Our findings contrast with the 
predictions of some who argue that 
the ACA will substantially disrupt or 
reduce employer-sponsored insurance. 
A common argument is that employers 
will drop coverage because the costs 
Table 4. Changes in ESI Offer Rates for Small Firms
Without reform ACA1
% Point 
difference
% Difference
< 10 Employees 35.3% 40.3% 5.0% 14.0%
10–24 Employees 64.3% 66.9% 2.6% 4.0%
25–49 Employees 77.5% 77.7% 0.2% 0.2%
Total 42.2% 46.5% 4.3% 10.2%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1 We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act fully implemented in 2010.
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of providing coverage outweigh the 
penalties for not offering it.15 Such a 
limited comparison provides little if any 
guidance on whether a firm would face 
an incentive to drop coverage. There 
are no penalties for not offering ESI 
now. Why would an employer currently 
offering coverage stop offering it due to 
the imposition of such a penalty? 
Firms offer ESI as a form of compensation 
because workers value health benefits, 
and by obtaining coverage through the 
employer, the firm contribution and 
often the worker contribution as well 
are excluded from income and payroll 
taxes. A fundamental result in labor 
and health economics, supported by 
empirical evidence, is that workers 
bear the full cost of health insurance 
coverage on average and over time. 
If a firm were to stop offering ESI, a 
competitive labor market would require 
firms to compensate the workers for the 
lost value by some other means, such as 
higher wages. The estimates presented 
here make this assumption and reflect a 
new long-run equilibrium.
Even under a short-term view that 
could generate savings to a firm, labor 
market competition prevents firms 
from simply dropping health insurance 
coverage without compensating 
workers by an amount sufficient to 
allow them to obtain similar coverage 
elsewhere—at least if they want to 
keep their current workforces. These 
considerations, which are broadly 
accepted by economists, are generally 
viewed with skepticism by those who 
operate businesses. This is likely because 
the mechanisms by which wages are 
adjusted are not apparent. They operate 
at a market level rather than a firm 
level and they operate over time rather 
than being the result of any conscious 
business decision. 
In a report released May 2010, Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin and Cameron Smith 
emphasize that the decision to offer 
insurance coverage is not simply a 
comparison between the direct costs 
of offering coverage and the penalty for 
not doing so.16 They present calculations 
for hypothetical workers and ESI plans 
that show that firms could drop benefits 
for workers with incomes under 300 
percent FPL (who would qualify for 
Medicaid or more generous subsidies 
in the nongroup exchanges), provide 
increased wages that offset the workers’ 
premium cost net of subsidy, and save 
money overall. Their computations are 
not inconsistent with the individual 
preferences simulated by HIPSM—
workers who would receive large 
subsidies are indeed more likely to 
prefer the exchanges.
In sizing up the magnitude of the 
incentive for firms to drop ESI due 
to the ACA, Holtz-Eakin and Smith 
roughly estimate the number of working 
Americans with incomes under 250 
percent of the FPL and state, “This 
suggests that there are about 43 million 
workers for whom it makes sense to 
drop insurance if the health plan costs 
the employer $11,941.” In our view, 
this relatively incomplete analysis 
greatly overstates the magnitude of firm 
incentives to drop ESI after reform. Our 
reasons include the following:
•	Nondiscrimination rules require that 
firms that offer health benefits offer 
them to all workers, and firms employ 
a mix of workers at different income 
levels. Firms would have an incentive 
to drop ESI only if the savings on 
low-income workers outweigh the 
costs of compensating all workers for 
the lost benefits. 
•	As shown in Table 5, the large majority 
(79 percent) of workers with their 
own ESI coverage have incomes above 
250 percent of the FPL. The share is 
higher (81 percent) in large firms. 
Firms would not have an incentive to 
drop coverage for these workers and 
would need to compensate them with 
higher wages if they did. 
•	Only 35 percent of ESI policyholders 
with incomes under 250 percent 
of the FPL select family coverage 
according to our estimates (Table 5). 
In 2014, a single policy would cost 
the employer around $5,100—far less 
than $11,941. This greatly reduces 
the savings firms would obtain from 
dropping ESI.
•	The tax advantage of ESI is unchanged 
under the ACA. Holtz-Eakin and 
Smith only consider federal income 
taxes, but employer premium 
contributions are excluded from 
payroll taxes and state income 
taxes (if applicable) as well. Many 
workers’ contributions to premiums 
are excluded from these taxes under 
Section 125 plans. When all relevant 
taxes are taken into account, firms 
that dropped ESI coverage would 
have to compensate the higher-
income workers even more. 
•	Higher-income workers tend to be 
older than lower-income workers. 
In large firms, half of workers with 
incomes more than 250 percent of the 
FPL are between the ages of 45 and 64 
(Table 5). In compensation for the loss 
of benefits to higher-income workers, 
an employer dropping coverage 
would need to raise wages enough to 
allow the worker to buy unsubsidized, 
age-rated coverage in the exchange. 
Equivalent age-rated coverage in the 
nongroup market would very likely 
be more expensive than average 
premium costs under ESI. Again, this 
implies a higher cost of compensating 
workers for lost ESI benefits.
•	The individual mandate raises demand 
for all types of coverage, including ESI 
coverage. There will be new demand 
for ESI coverage among currently 
uninsured workers who already have 
offers and those who do not. This 
acts as a counter-incentive to firms 
dropping coverage.
•	The empirical findings of Gruber 
and Lettau (2004) suggest that the 
preferences of high-wage workers  
in a firm carry more weight than  
the preferences of low-wage workers. 
If applicable, this would temper 
incentives for an employer to  
drop ESI.17
•	 It may not be sufficient for a firm 
to boost the wages of workers 
who lose ESI coverage. Pay equity 
considerations could require that 
all workers, even those who did not 
participate in the employer’s plan, 
receive wage increases. This would 
add to the cost of dropping coverage. 
•	 In Massachusetts, which passed a 
landmark set of reforms in 2006 
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similar to those in the ASA, the rate 
of employer-sponsored coverage 
increased about 3 percent from fall 
2006 to fall 2009, a period covering 
both the implementation of the state 
reforms and a 4.5 percentage point 
rise in the state unemployment 
rate.18 The Massachusetts experience 
suggests that the combination of 
individual and employer mandates  
can increase ESI coverage, even  
when subsidized alternatives to  
ESI are introduced. 
For each of these reasons, most of which 
HIPSM accounts for, we believe the risk 
of widespread dropping of employer-
sponsored coverage due to the ACA is 
far lower than some have suggested, 
particularly among large firms. Any 
economic incentives to drop employer-
sponsored health insurance due to 
the ACA would not even begin to take 
effect until sometime after 2014, when 
the exchanges are up, running, and 
perceived as a viable alternative to ESI. 
The extent of dropping due to the 
ACA could be larger than we predict, 
however, if workers and firms were 
to re-sort or reorganize into ones 
employing mainly low-income workers 
and others employing mainly high-
income workers substantially more than 
is the case today. Because firms already 
face such incentives and because a 
diverse mix of skills is needed for most 
enterprises, we think the scope for 
ACA-induced restructuring of firms is 
limited and dominated by the other 
considerations we have described. It 
is, however, an additional source of 
uncertainty in our estimates. 
If there is more dropping of ESI than 
our estimates suggest, more workers 
will obtain coverage through Medicaid 
and the nongroup exchanges, driving 
up government costs of the reforms and 
reducing employer costs. Any savings 
employers obtain in total compensation 
costs in the short run will be largely 
dissipated over time as labor markets 
re-equilibrate. Reductions in the price 
of labor induced by health insurance 
subsidies will increase firms’ demand 
for labor and lead to firms bidding 
wages higher. 
As we have noted, the tax advantage 
that employer-sponsored insurance 
enjoys under current law is unchanged 
under the ACA. It has been argued that 
the excise tax on high-cost premiums 
would nullify this advantage over 
time.19 The value of the tax advantage 
has been estimated to be around 40 
percent of the premium. While this is 
the rate of the excise tax, the tax will 
apply only to the value in excess of a 
specified threshold, not to the total 
value of coverage. Thus, the two will 
not be offsetting.
Many have argued that health care costs 
under reform would be much higher 
than without reform, adding to the 
reasons employers may drop coverage 
after reform. Health care costs have 
been increasing for many years; the 
trend of employers dropping coverage 
due to increasing health care costs is 
not new. It was, in fact, an important 
motive for health reform. Our estimates 
show that trend would have continued 
or even accelerated without the ACA, 
leading to noticeable losses in employer-
sponsored coverage. It should not be 
confused with the potential effect of 
provisions of the ACA. 
The employer dropping that has 
occurred over the past decade has 
been concentrated heavily among small 
employers, while offer rates among the 
largest employers have been almost 
unchanged. For example, according to 
estimates from the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey-Insurance Component 
(MEPS-IC), the offer rate for firms with 
fewer than 10 employees declined from 
46.6 percent in 2000 to 43.7 percent 
in 2008, while the offer rate for firms 
with 1,000 or more employees changed 
slightly—from 99.4 percent in 2000 
to 98.9 percent in 2008.20 Ultimately, 
this trend of declining ESI offer can be 
addressed only by effective cost control 
measures. Beyond cost control, the ACA 
can slow this trend in declining ESI offer 
via subsidies to small employers, by cost 
savings generated by the exchanges, 
and by increasing the demand for ESI 
through the individual mandate.
Claims that the ACA will greatly 
increase health care costs for businesses 
often focus exclusively on provisions 
that would increase costs, such as the 
tax on insurers or noting that many 
more people would have insurance 
coverage, while ignoring cost-savings 
provisions. Increases in total societal 
health care costs, such as the costs of 
health insurance for those currently 
Table 5: Workers in Offering Firms with Own ESI Coverage
Firm Size Group Worker's Income N
% within Firm 
Size Group
% with  
Single Policy
% age 45 – 54 % age 55 – 64
100 or fewer Employees
Under 250% FPL 4,918,974 26.98% 65.33% 20.39% 11.47%
Over 250% FPL 13,312,462 73.02% 66.89% 28.37% 20.70%
101 - 1000 Employees
Under 250% FPL 3,368,409 19.59% 62.83% 20.76% 12.42%
Over 250% FPL 13,829,047 80.41% 62.25% 29.52% 18.48%
Over 1000 Employees
Under 250% FPL 7,404,683 19.20% 65.99% 20.96% 10.88%
Over 250% FPL 31,163,249 80.80% 60.36% 30.10% 20.22%
All Firm Sizes
Under 250% FPL 15,692,066 21.21% 65.10% 20.74% 11.40%
Over 250% FPL 58,304,758 78.79% 62.30% 29.56% 19.92%
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uninsured, will not necessarily raise the 
costs individual businesses face. Since 
the individual mandate will increase 
demand for coverage, some employers 
currently offering ESI will face higher 
take-up rates, increasing their costs due 
to higher enrollment. Take-up rates are 
already high; the average across all firm 
sizes is nearly 80 percent.21 The largest 
increases in health care costs due to 
health reform will typically involve 
employers that do not offer insurance 
coverage today; these employers 
will either choose to start offering 
insurance or face the possibility of a 
penalty should their workers obtain 
subsidies through the health insurance 
exchanges. Such increases would not 
result in a decline in ESI coverage.
Conclusion
Overall rates of ESI coverage 
would change little under the ACA. 
Modeling the major coverage provisions 
of the ACA as if fully implemented in 
2010, we estimate that the number 
of nonelderly adults covered by an 
employer-sponsored insurance plan 
would be very slightly lower under the 
ACA than without health reform (151.2 
million v. 151.6 million). There would be 
a 2.2 percent increase in ESI enrollment 
through the plans of employers with 
more than 1,000 employees, while 
smaller employers would see little 
change in enrollment.
ESI premiums would fall noticeably 
for small firms and decline somewhat 
for others. The average employer 
premium contribution per person 
covered by insurance sponsored by 
small firms would fall by 7.9 percent, a 
significant reduction in premiums. The 
average premium contribution would 
fall by 1.1 percent for medium firms and 
3.1 percent for large firms. Overall, the 
average premium contribution would 
fall by 3.9 percent under the ACA.
Total spending by small firms would 
fall. Health care spending by small firms 
(100 or fewer employees) would decline 
by 8.7 percent under the ACA. The 
change for small firms is due primarily 
to an 8.2 percent decline in spending 
on premium contributions. The average 
employer premium contribution per 
person covered by ESI declines under the 
ACA for small firms by 7.9 percent. Thus, 
even after controlling for the decrease in 
enrollment, it is less expensive for small 
firms to provide insurance under the ACA 
than without health reform. This is due 
mainly to the introduction of ESI health 
insurance exchanges (SHOP exchanges) 
for small businesses. This is one of the 
most important provisions of the ACA for 
small businesses and has been strangely 
absent from most commentary on how 
health reform would affect employers. 
ESI exchanges would provide a new 
more cost-effective ESI option to small 
businesses. 
Exchanges provide two main advantages. 
First, the administrative loads of ESI 
premiums vary greatly with firm size, and 
the smallest firms have the highest loads 
built into their premiums. Loads for the 
smallest firms are little different from 
typical administrative loads for nongroup 
insurance, and both are significantly 
higher than that likely to prevail in the 
new exchanges as a consequence  of the 
ACA’s market reforms (e.g., prohibition 
against medical underwriting, minimum 
loss ratios, more centralized marketing) 
and increased competition among plans. 
The second advantage of these plans and 
the market reforms implemented with 
them is that there would be far more 
sharing of risk within the small-group 
and nongroup insurance markets. Under 
the ACA, purchasers in these markets 
could no longer be charged higher 
premiums as a consequence of the health 
status or claims experience of their 
enrollees, a practice common across the 
country today. Thus, increased sharing 
of risk would make the availability 
of affordable ESI coverage far more 
dependable for small firms with higher-
than-average-cost workers. Today, high 
health costs incurred by a few enrollees 
can make coverage for an entire small 
firm unaffordable simply because there 
are not enough workers over which to 
spread these excess costs.
Total spending for medium-sized 
firms would increase. In contrast 
with the results for small firms, total 
premium contributions for medium 
firms (101 to 1,000 employees) would 
be almost unchanged. However, these  
firms would pay $11.8 billion in employer 
assessments. The smallest firms, those 
with fewer than 50 workers, are exempt 
from all employer assessments, so the 
average effect on employers of 100 or 
fewer is smaller than the effect on the 
medium-sized firm group. Also, the 
assessment formula for nonoffering 
employers disregards the first 30 
workers obtaining subsidies in the 
exchanges, which would constitute  
an assessment discount of a third 
or more for employers of 50 to 100 
workers. Premium assessments are 
higher for medium firms than for 
large firms because they have a higher 
proportion of low-income workers and 
lower ESI offer rates. Some employers 
may be able to reduce their assessments 
by reducing the workers’ premium 
contribution rate, particularly for 
lower-wage workers, or by changing 
the structure of the plans they offer. 
For example, an employer could raise 
its premium contribution rate so that 
fewer low-income workers offered ESI 
could qualify for exchange subsidies, 
thus reducing its assessment. Any such 
optimization of contribution rates and 
benefit package structure would be 
highly specific to a given business and 
its workers. Thus, we do not simulate 
such behavior.
Total spending for large firms 
would not change. Large firms would 
see a modest increase in ESI enrollment, 
but their total health care spending, 
including premium contributions, 
assessments, and vouchers, would 
increase by only 1 percent. This is 
important because large-firm ESI 
policies cover more people than small- 
and medium-firm ESI policies combined.
Total spending by employers of 
all sizes would decrease slightly. 
When we take into account the ESI 
premium contributions for persons 
in our underlying survey data for 
whom employer characteristics of the 
policyholder cannot be identified, total 
health care spending by employers 
would be $513.3 billion under the ACA 
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and $510.2 billion without reform, a 
decrease of 0.6 percent.
Our estimates contrast with various 
claims of adverse effects of health 
reform on businesses for reasons we 
discuss. In particular, small businesses 
will clearly benefit, enjoying lower 
overall costs and lower premiums. 
Some medium-sized businesses would 
see significant increases in spending 
due to assessments if they do not offer 
coverage or offer coverage that their 
low-income workers cannot afford. 
These increases could mean lower 
wages for workers in those firms. 
Large firms would see little change. 
Thus, claims that the uncertainties 
surrounding the impact of health 
reform on businesses would hamper  
the economic recovery are not justified.
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